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RECENT CASES
CARRIERS-ECONoMIc BURDENS ON OPERATOR-LESSORS OF MOTOR
VEHICLES SUPPORT FINDING OF CONTRACT RATHER THAN PRIVATE
CARRIAGE UNDER ICC's SUBSTANCE TEST
The Oklahoma Furniture Manufacturing Company was engaged for
some years in the private delivery of its own products, an activity which is
exempt from the licensing provision of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Recently, the company, for reasons unrelated to the commerce act, set up
an arrangement in which a number of drivers held title to tractors which
the company leased at a fixed rate per mile, the lessor-drivers paying for
gas and oil, license plates, and other operating expenses. The company
retained sole right to control the use of the vehicles, serviced them, and
paid property and liability insurance on them. The company and the
drivers looked upon the latter as employees, who received wages for their
services as drivers and rent for the use of their tractors. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, on its own initiative, investigated this operation.
It ruled that the drivers were engaged in contract carriage subject to the
ICC's licensing procedure, and ordered them to cease and desist from
operating until they obtained licenses.' The District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma set aside the order and held that the arrangement
was one of private carriage by the company.2 The Supreme Court in turn
reversed, holding that the Commission's conclusion was warranted in view
of the transfer to the lessor-drivers of some of the financial risks of the
transportation business. United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1962).
Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act requires common and contract
carriers to obtain licenses before engaging in the carriage of persons or
property in interstate commerce.3 In setting up the regulatory scheme,
however, Congress left a residuary category of "private" carriers 4-
comprising those which fell outside the definition of both common 5 and
contract6 carriers. One result of this division has been the difficulty of
I Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403 (1959).
2 Drum v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Okla. 1960).
3 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1958).
4 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II § 203 (a) (17), 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
§303(a) (17) (1958).
5 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II § 203(a) (14), 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
§303(a) (14) (1958).
6 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II § 203(a) (15), 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (15) (1958).
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determining the status of those carriers which have some characteristics of
private and others of for-hire service. 7 The Commission has used two
tests to classify these ambivalent operations, the "primary business" test,
not relevant to the present case,8 and the "control test." The control test
seeks to distinguish between operations which are functionally shipping
departments under the control of a manufacturer or seller and operations
which are independent of any shipper.9 The essence of the control test is
the right of one party or the other to "control, direct, and dominate" the
performance of the operation in question.1 0 If the shipper retains that
right, the carriage is private; if the carrier has it, the carriage is for-hire
and subject to regulation."1 In the past four years, concern over attempts
by carriers to reorganize their operations to appear in form as mere lessors
to private carriers and thereby to evade regulation'12 has led the Commis-
sion to talk in terms of another test-one of "substance," 13 a term of un-
certain content. Although the lower federal courts have for many years
looked to "substance," rather than mere form, when distinguishing be-
tween private and for-hire carriage,' 4 the present case represents the first
judicial approval of a "substance" test of the sort used by the Commission.
In its opinion below, the Commission rested its decision on both control
and substance tests and found under either standard the arrangement in
question constituted for-hire carriage.' 5 On review the district court held
that the Commission had misapplied the control test and that under any
view the furniture company controlled its own shipping operations.'0 The
7 See ICC, BuREAu OF TRANSPORTATION ECONOmIcs & STATIsTIcs, THE GRAY
AREA OF TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS (1960).
8 The company's primary business was indisputably manufacturing. Oklahoma
Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403, 408 (1959).
9 See H. B. Church Truck Serv. Co., 27 M.C.C. 191 (1940), modified, 33 M.C.C.
160 (1942).
10 Id. at 195.
"lIbid. The lease of equipment with drivers gives rise to a presumption of
for-hire carriage, which may be overcome by a showing that the shipper has the
"exclusive right and privilege of directing and controlling the transportation service
... " Id. at 196. The Commission has often said that no single factor is deter-
minative of which party has the right to control. See, e.g., R. N. G. Commercial
Auto Renters, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 665, 669 (1957).
1
2 See, e.g., 74 ICC ANN. REI. 57-58 (1960); 73 ICC ANN. REP. 50-51 (1959).
13 It appears that the first explicit recognition of a substance test in a motor
carrier case before the ICC was in Pacific Diesel Rental Co., 78 M.C.C. 161, 172
(1958).
14 See, e.g., Lamb v. ICC, 259 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1958) ; A. W. Stickle & Co.
v. ICC, 128 F.2d 155 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942) ; Georgia Truck
Sys., Inc. v. ICC, 123 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1941).
15 Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403, 411, 414 (1959).
16 The Commission had concluded that whenever the lessor of a vehicle drove it
himself he retained the right to control. The district court recognized, Drum v.
United States, 193 F. Supp. 275, 281 (W.D. Okla. 1960), that this finding, in effect,
made the heretofore rebuttable presumption of for-hire carriage, see note 11 supra,
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United States did not argue this issue on appeal, but rested its case instead
on the correctness of the Commission's application of the "substance"
test,17 which was articulated as follows: "[A] re any persons here, in sub-
stance, engaged in the business of . . . transportation . . . for hire?" 18
So put, the test appears to do no more than repeat the very issue in the
case. Unless some objective meaning can be ascribed to the words "in
substance," such a test opens the door to a purely subjective disposition
by the Commission The crucial question, then, is the meaning of "sub-
stance." As the term was used by the lower federal courts its meaning
was fairly clear. In every case in which a court has talked of substance,
for-hire carriage could have been found under an objective criterion, such
as control. 19 In many of these cases, although the form of the equipment
leases purported to establish private carriage, the parties did not in fact
adhere strictly to the contracts but conducted their operations in a manner
inconsistent with private carriage, the lessors actually controlling the op-
erations.20 In couching their decisions in terms of substance, therefore,
the courts meant no more than that the inquiry should be directed to the
reality of the conduct rather than to the form under which the operations
are set up. The crucial issue was who really controlled, as opposed to
who had the right, under the contract, to control-in effect a subtle appli-
cation of the control test.2 1 The "substance test" of the Commission in
irrebuttable in the case of a lease by an owner-operator and was inconsistent with
the often repeated pronouncement that no single factor is conclusive of the question
as to who has the right to control. The district court was of the opinion that the
presumption was not technically applicable in the instant case, since the presumption
arises when a situation in which there is a "lease of equipment with drivers." The
court thought that the instant case presented a situation of a "lease of equipment
alone with the drivers to be supplied by the Company." It concluded, in any case,
that there was more than enough evidence to rebut "any presumption or inference."
The Commission's finding under the control test also appears to contradict its
previous position with regard to arrangements such as the one in the instant case.
In Watson Mfg. Co., 51 M.C.C. 223, 226 (1949), on facts virtually identical to those
in the present case, the Commission held that the operations constituted private car-
riage, finding that "there is no question but that the applicant-lessee controls the
tractor-trailer unit." The only factors distinguishing the two cases are that in
Watson the shipper garaged the vehicles and paid for gas and oil. Significantly, the
Commission did not refer to the Watson case in its opinion.
17 See United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 381 (1962); Brief for the United
States and Interstate Commerce Commission, p. 17 n.8.
1s Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403, 410 (1959).
19 In some of the cases the Commission's primary business test would have been
applicable to the facts. E.g., A. W. Stickle & Co. v. ICC, 128 F.2d 155 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942).20 E.g., Lamb v. ICC, 259 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Georgia Truck Sys., Inc.
v. ICC, 123 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1941) ; ICC v. Werner, 106 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ill.
1951); United States v. La Tuff Transfer Serv., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 375 (D. Minn.
1950).
2 1 In addition, findings of subterfuge and a motive to evade regulation have in-
variably accompanied the use of the substance test by the courts. See cases cited
notes 19, 20 supra. Such findings would appear to be unnecessary and even irrele-
vant since the issue in these cases is whether or not a company possesses certain
characteristics, not whether it intended to possess them. Nevertheless, the absence
of an allegation of subterfuge in the instant case, 368 U.S. at 396 (dissenting opinion),
is further indication that the substance tests of the Commission and the courts were
based on different standards.
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the present case apparently was not the same. The Commission said that
in determining who had "the exclusive right to control" there was "little
probative weight" in the fact that the company, in practice, controlled the
shipping.P Overlooking this language, both the district court and the
Supreme Court treated the federal court precedents as relevant. The dis-
trict court, reversing, held that in reality as well as in form the carriage in
question was private.2 3 The Supreme Court was content merely to invoke
the name of the federal court "substance test" in order to show that such
a test does exist; 24 it did not bother to inquire further whether this was in
fact the test which the Commission had applied.
Examination of the Commission's opinion suggests that its substance
test is not founded on any objective criterion and is thus almost directly
contrary to the court-made substance test. Concentrating on the crucial
fact that the company exercised considerable control over the lessor-drivers
as employees, the Commission said:
Here . . .we believe that it is evident that were we to hold that
the shipper's assumption (as an employer) of certain responsi-
bilities which more normally fall upon a carrier, transforms an
operation which, apart from such assumption, is clearly a for-hire
carrier service, into an operation different in substance, we would
open the door to unfair and destructive competitive practices con-
trary to the national transportation policy declared by Congress.
We are convinced that the owner-operator respondents here are,
in substance, engaged in the business of interstate transportation
. . . for-hire . . . .
Far from analyzing the problem, this thicket of parentheticals only begs
the question. Does the fact that the furniture company actually exercised
control over the lessor-drivers as employees make the Oklahoma operation
different "in substance" from one of contract carriage in which the shipper
lacked such control? The Commission avoided an answer. It looked
neither to the Congressional purpose in creating different rules for private
and for-hire carriage nor to precedent to see whether the peculiarities of
fact in the present case should be treated as significant or have been so
treated in the past. Instead, it ducked the problem altogether and said
that a holding that shipper control over the drivers means private carriage
would open the door to "destructive competitive practices"-presumably
by tempting contract carriers the country over to escape regulation by as-
suming the guise of an Oklahoma Furniture-like operation.2 6 This seems
22 Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403, 411 (1959).
23 Drum v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 275, 281 (W.D. Okla. 1960).
24 Instant case at 385-86.
25 Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403, 414 (1959).
26 See note 21 mipra.
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like the approach in the classic joke: if we do the right thing in this case,
we may have to do it again. Moreover, the Commission here seemed un-
aware of the difference between thinking that a certain type of service
should be regulated in order to eliminate unfair competition and holding
that such service is private carriage under the Interstate Commerce Act.
In effect the Commission said that for reasons best known to itself it did
not think that the operation before it should be treated as private and,
therefore, it was not private.
The opinion of the Supreme Court, ignoring the effort of the district
court to inject objectivity into the problem by applying the "control in
substance" test of the lower federal courts,27 only added confusion to the
picture. It characterized the substance test as one turning on the transfer
to the drivers of certain significant financial burdens of the transportation
business, such as initial capital outlay and operating costs. s But the
burdens taken on by the lessor-drivers in the present case were no
greater-and perhaps were less-than the normal concomitants of an equip-
ment rental,- which have never been held sufficient in themselves to trans-
form otherwise private into contract carriage.30 In fact, the Commission
reaffirmed a line of precedents to this effect in its opinion below (indicat-
ing that the shift of economic burdens was not the crux of its substance
test) .31 In the light of the Supreme Court's holding, however, the au-
thority of these decisions now appears to be in question. The Commission
may obediently carry the Court's reasoning over to the area of bare equip-
ment rentals. Such an extension of the present case would be unfortunate,
since shippers who merely rent vehicles and in all other ways control their
own operation are clearly private carriers within the congressional in-
tent.32 Regulation of equipment rentals should be accomplished, if at all, 33
2 7 See instant case at 384 & n.29.
28 Instant case at 379-80, 385.
29 The fact that in the present case Oklahoma paid for property and public lia-
bility insurance and undertook maintenance of the vehicles suggests that the financial
burdens it shifted to the owner-operators may have been less substantial than the
risks ordinarily assumed by mere lessors in the motor carrier field. In addition,
despite an inference to the contrary, Brief for the United States and Interstate Com-
merce Commission, p. 22 (assertion that drivers were paid only for "transportation
actually performed"), it is clear that Oklahoma assumed the risk of an unproductive
backhaul by paying the owner-operators at the same rate for outbound and return
trips, regardless of the amount of freight carried. 368 U.S. at 380; Brief for
Weather-Seal, Inc., as Intervening Appellees, p. 13; see 368 U.S. at 397 & n.17 (dis-
senting opinion).
30 See, e.g., Scott Bros., 32 M.C.C. 253, modified, 34 M.C.C. 163 (1942);
U-Drive-It Co., 23 M.C.C. 799 (1940).
31 Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 M.C.C. 403, 414-15 (1959).
32 See, e.g., cases cited note 30 supra.
33 Such regulation might give rise to constitutional due process issues, as it has
in the case of similar legislation by some states. See Nutting & Kuhn, Motor
Carrier Regulation--The Third Phase, 10 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 477 (1949). Compare
Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948), with
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Blanton, 305 Ky. 179, 202 S.W.2d 433 (1947).
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through specific legislation, as has been done in several states,3 4 rather
than by classifying lessors as contract carriers when they do not really
provide complete services.
In view of the trouble at all levels in articulating the standard upon
which the Commission based its decision, the Supreme Court should have
restrained the Commission from expanding its own jurisdiction to cover
arrangements like those between the furniture company and its drivers.
The Commission's opinion contained little more than a recital of the facts
of the case, the vague formula to be applied, and a conclusion, without
explanation of how or whether each fit the other-an intuitive process ill-
suited to setting up a standard of legality to guide future conduct.3 5 This
approach has been much criticized when applied to licensing or rate-
making,36 and is even more suspect when the decision governs the scope of
the Commission's own jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, instead of seek-
ing to rationalize this veiled exercise of discretion, should have remanded
the case to the Commission for an articulation of an objective standard re-
lated to the legislative purpose, and should have admonished the Com-
mission to refrain from blurring the line between private and for-hire
carriage by the use of a subjective standard.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COLORADO ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
ACT HELD INAPPLICABLE TO HIRING OF PILOT BY INTERSTATE AIR-
LINE BECAUSE OF BURDEN TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Acting on a complaint, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission
found that Continental Airlines, in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrim-
ination Act of 1957,1 had refused a man employment as a pilot solely be-
34 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. §281.011(1) (1959) (expressly included lessors of
vehicles in the term "motor carrier"); Pa. Laws 1943, act 373, §§ 1-11 (declared
unconstitutional in Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, supra note 33).
35The Administrative Procedure Act §8(b), 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1007(b) (1958), requires that all decisions include a statement of the reasons or
bases of all findings and conclusions. This section reaffirms the holdings of the
Supreme Court that the conclusions of administrative agencies must be supported by
clear and intelligible findings. See United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
315 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1942); United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 293 U.S. 454,
464 (1935). The practice of making findings of fact and then saying, ipse dixit, that
the facts come within a statutory standard should not be sufficient. "This identifi-
cation is not automatic or self-evident." JAFE & NATHANSoN, ADMINISTRAT LAW
730 (2d ed. 1961). See judge Frank's seriocomic dissenting opinion in Old Colony
Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 161 F.2d 413, 450-51 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 858-59 (1947). Cf. Radio Station KFH Co. v. FCC, 247 F.2d 570
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
36 See Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., supra note 35,
at 450-51; Hearings on Truck Mergers and Concentration Before the Senate Select
Committee on Sinall Business, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1957).
I Colo. REv. STAT. ANx. § 80-24 (1957).
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cause he was a Negro. The Commission ordered Continental to give the
rejected applicant first opportunity to enroll in its next training course. On
review a Colorado district court ordered the complaint dismissed. The
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed and held that since the regulation
of racial discrimination by interstate carriers is a subject requiring na-
tional uniformity, the state was without jurisdiction to apply the act to
employment of flight personnel by an interstate airline. Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 368 P.2d 970
(Colo. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3375 (U.S. May 26,
1962) (No. 1001).
Although Congress has the primary power under the Constitution to
regulate interstate commerce, it has long been recognized that the states
too may regulate, in areas in which Congress has not, even though the
regulation may affect commerce.2 But it has been difficult to determine
when state regulation has gone so far as to exceed the limited local bounds
of state power and has begun to impede the free flow of commerce.3 To
aid it in drawing this line the Supreme Court has formulated what may
be called the "uniformity-burden" test-whether the subject to be regu-
lated is one requiring national uniformity and whether the regulation im-
poses an undue burden on interstate commerce.4 Stripped of its generality
this test requires that the Court weigh the local interest involved against
the burden created.5 Two leading cases sixty-nine years apart called for
the application of this test in the area of racial discrimination by interstate
carriers. Hall v. DeCuir 6 struck down a Louisiana statute of Recon-
struction vintage requiring white and Negro passengers to be given equal
rights to use all steamboat accommodations. The Court said that the
physical and economic difficulties involved in changing accommodations
when passing between states having different rules concerning segregation
imposed too great a burden on the free flow of commerce and hence, ab-
sent congressional action, the carriers must be free to make reasonable
regulations concerning accommodations. 7 In Morgan v. Virginia 8 the
2 E.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851); Willson v.
Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244 (1829).
3 Ccnpare, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945) (length of trains), and South Covington & C. St. Ry. v. City of Covington,
235 U.S. 537 (1915) (temperature of cars), and Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky,
154 U.S. 204, 220 (1894) (bridge tolls), all of which struck down state legislation,
with, e.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (exclusion from
use of ferry), and The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-400 (1913) (freight
and passenger rates), and Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (unfit citrus), all
of which upheld the power of the state to act. See, Note, Discrimination and the
Comnerce Clause, 58 YALE L.J. 329, 330 (1949).
4 See cases cited note 3 .rupra.
5 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945);
Stern, The Problems of Yester.year-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REV.
446, 453 (1951).
6 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
7 Id. at 489.
8 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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Court held that a Virginia statute requiring segregated seating for inter-
state Negro passengers imposed upon commerce a practical burden of
changing seats and was therefore, under the reasoning of Hall, invalid.
These two cases, though factually dealing with problems in the handling
of passengers passing from state to state and not with the hiring of carrier
employees in a given state, were the chief authority relied on by the
court in the present case.
The keystone passage of the court's opinion concluded with the fol-
lowing statement:
Racial discrimination by an interstate carrier is a subject which
must be free from diverse regulation by the several states and
governed uniformly, if at all, by the Congress of the United
States.
9
To support this conclusion the court cited only Hall and Morgan, and in
so interpreting these cases the court was clearly wrong. It failed to con-
sider that the ultimate question in each case was not whether racial dis-
crimination must be free from diverse regulation, but rather whether the
attempt by the state to deny or impose discrimination resulted in improper
burdens on commerce. The statutes in each case were struck down be-
cause their implementation required, or, in conjunction with other state
laws, could require, burdensome shifting of passengers at each state line
crossed. The Supreme Court was careful in both cases to deemphasize
the politically explosive issue of racial discrimination and the "Southern
way of life." For this very reason, more recent decisions of the Court
indicating that legislation based on race can no longer be valid 10 do not
impair the force of the Hall and Morgan holdings that the burden of
passenger shuffling in itself renders state regulation excessive.
An examination of the facts in the present case shows that no com-
parable burden was imposed by the Colorado law. Not only has the
possibility of conflicting discriminatory regulations by other states been
foreclosed,"1 but the hiring of a flight crew is essentially local in nature.
The regulations here deal with activities completed before interstate move-
ment is begun, as contrasted with regulations which affect the route of
movement'12 or the make-up of the carrier.'3 In the latter situations, the
I Instant case at 973.
10 "We have settled beyond question that no State may require racial segregation
of interstate or intrastate transportation facilities. The question is no longer open;
it is foreclosed as a litigable issue." Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962)
(per curiam). Although there was no Supreme Court case permitting segregation
legislation at the time of the Hall decision, one which served to strengthen the power
of the states to provide the legislation the Hall (and later, Morgan) Court
had in mind was soon to come. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11 E.g., Bailey v. Patterson, .vtpra note 10.
12 E.g., St. Louis, S.F. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 369 (1923); Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896).
13 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 136 (1910).
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carrier is faced with the necessity of altering its schedules and practices
at each state line. In the employment context, in contrast, once a crew
has been hired in Colorado, regulation has ended; there is no need to
change at state lines, since no further hiring-to which another state's
employment laws might apply-is necessary. Therefore there is no burden
on interstate commerce in any practical sense; certainly no more than that
imposed by state statutes requiring licensing of train engineers,1 4 full train
crews,15 or eye examinations for engineers,10 all of which have been up-
held; and far less than that imposed by the Hall and Morgan statutes.' 7
Fair employment practice acts have done much to end discrimination
in employment.' 8 To make them of optimum value a state should be
able to apply them to interstate employers as well as intrastate. It is un-
fortunate that a court today should, when faced with a choice between
interpretations of precedent, choose the one which leads to the result in
the present case. A narrow reading of Hall and Morgan would have per-
mitted the court both to uphold the state statute and to conform to the
policy of the Supreme Court in the area of equal protection in which it
has shown particular concern.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CAT oRiN AND PENNSYLVANIA
COURTS Div=D ON QUESTION OF ADmissBmrY OF DBTAms OF
PRIOR UNTRELATED OFFEiTSES AT HEARING ON SENTENCING UNDER
SPLIT VERDICT STATUTES
A majority of states including Pennsylvania permit jury discretion to
control imposition of the penalty in capital cases.' Since the penalty is
generally fixed in the same verdict in which the jury finds guilt, its deter-
14 See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
'5 See Chicago, R-I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).
16 See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
17 The court failed to discuss the significance of the case of Bob-Lo Excursion
Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948), which sustained the discriminatory rule against
Negroes enforced by a boat line running to a pleasure island near Detroit. Though
the island was in Canada, maldng the transportation foreign commerce, the Supreme
Court said that Hall and Morgan could be distinguished in several ways-"in the
attenuating effects, if any, upon the commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states . . . ; or in any actual probability of conflicting regulations by differ-
ent sovereignties." Id. at 39. Following this line of analysis the Colorado Supreme
Court might have looked to the "attenuating effect" of the antidiscrimination statute
and to the "actual probability of conflicting regulation." On such criteria the statute
could have been sustained. Interestingly, on the other hand, the court did note that
the United States, in an amicus brief filed by the Assistant Attorney General of the
United States, argued that the application of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act
did not pose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Instant case at 972.
18 See, e.g., Legislation, 36 NoTRE DAME LAW. 189 (1961); Kovarsky, A Review
of State FEPC Laws, 9 LAB. L.J. 478 (1958).
1 The most recent collection of statutes dealing with jury discretion in fixing the
death penalty may be found in Handler, Background Evidence in Murder Cases, 51
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mination must be based upon evidence admissible during the trial of the
issue of guilt. Pennsylvania, prior to 1959, was alone in its policy of
permitting introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior unrelated
offenses, otherwise inadmissible, to be considered solely on the question of
punishment, during the trial of the issue of guilt.2 Such evidence was
limited to the official record of prior convictions and admissions of the
defendant; to this extent, however, the courts overrode the common-law
policy of excluding such evidence because of its prejudicial impact on the
issue of guilt,3 as well as a Pennsylvania legislative policy to the same
effect.4 In decisions following the leading case of Commonwealth v.
Parker,5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court restricted the number of situa-
tions in which this evidence might be admitted,6 but admission was held to
be reversible error only in a clear case of abuse of the trial court's dis-
cretion. 7 Although the trial judge was required to charge that the evidence
could be considered only on the issue of penalty,8 the real effect of this
J. CRmw. L., C. & P.S. 317 (1960). For other recent collections, see Andres v.
United States, 333 U.S. 740, 768 (1948) (appendix to concurring opinion of Frank-
furter, J.); MODEL PE ,r. CODE § 201, app. D (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Pennsyl-
vania's original statute was passed in 1925, Pa. Laws 1925, act 411, § 1, as amended,
Pa. Laws 1939, act 375, § 701.
2 See 1 WIGM RF, EVIDENCE § 194(b) (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1959) ; Note, 33 TEMP.
L.Q. 89 (1959) ; 19 U. Pirr. L. Rnv. 666, 667 (1958). There are instances in other
states where such evidence has been admitted on this ground, but no state has a
consistent policy of admission. See generally Handler, supra note 1.
8 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); McCoamicK, EviDENcE
§ 157 (1954); 1 WHARTON, CRimiNAL EvDENcE § 232 (12th ed. 1955); 1 WIGOORE,
EviDENcE § 57 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1959).
4 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 711 (1930). This statute prohibits the use of prior
unrelated offenses to impeach the testimony of the defendant as his own witness
except in cases where he puts his good character in issue or testifies against a co-
defendant. The statute was amended in 1947, Pa. Laws 1947, act 505, § 1, to apply
to evidence admitted at any time during the trial "which tends to show" that defendant
had committed prior offenses, but the amendment was declared unconstitutional in
Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A.2d 649, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 852
(1949). See PA. STAT. AxN. tit 19, § 711 (Supp. 1961). These acts support the
inference of a definite legislative policy to limit use of evidence of prior offenses
committed by a criminal defendant during his trial for a subsequent offense. See
generally Note, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 853 (1948) ; Legislation, 22 TEnm. L.Q. 220 (1948);
Legislation, 11 U. Pr. L. REv. 119 (1949).
5294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
6 Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 152, 160 Atl. 602, 608 (1932) : "Where
the trial judge is convinced that such crime was committed for profit, such as the
crimes of highway robbery, burglary . . . and the like, and that the criminals are
habitual offenders against society, then prior convictions may properly be received
by the jury as an aid in determining the penalty to be inflicted!' See Commonwealth
v. Kurutz, 312 Pa. 343, 34, 168 Atl. 28, 30 (1933); Commonwealth v. Jones, 355
Pa. 594, 597, 50 A.2d 342, 344 (1947) (dictum).
7See Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 868 (1961); Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 155-56, 160 Atl. 602, 609
(1932). But see Commonwealth v. Clark, 322 Pa. 321, 324, 185 At. 764, 765 (1936).
8 Commonwealth v. McCoy, 401 Pa. 100, 103, 162 A.2d 636, 637 (1960); Com-
monwealth v. Thompson, 389 Pa. 382, 133 A.2d 207, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 849 (1957).
The judge is permitted to comment on the weight and effect of the evidence as well.
See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A.2d 401, cert. denied, 342 U.S.
835 (1951); Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 1099, 1123 (1953).
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charge was probably to emphasize the fact that the defendant had a criminal
record. 9 The court recognized the prejudicial impact of this evidence, but
did not find that objection "insurmountable." 10 Critics of this Pennsyl-
vania policy argued that the need to avoid prejudice at the trial of guilt
or innocence outweighed the need to provide the jury with more informa-
tion about the defendant's character. To deal with the problem of prejudice
and at the same time permit use of that information, they advocated the
split-verdict procedure." In response to this pressure, 2 section 4701 of
the Penal Code was amended in 1959 13 to provide for a supplemental
hearing and verdict in capital cases, after the jury's verdict of guilty had
been recorded.' 4 The amendment was probably directed solely at the
specific problem posed by the Parker rule: unfairness during the trial of
the issue of guilt. But the statute permits the admission of "additional
evidence" during the hearing without providing any standards for the
scope of the evidence, thereby leaving open the question of whether evi-
dence of prior criminal conduct should be limited to the defendant's record
and admissions, or should include testimony of the details of prior offenses.
In Commonwealth v. McCoy,15 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
asked to construe the split-verdict statute. Although the court refused to
reverse, holding that the admission of testimony concerning the defendant's
brutality in the commission of a prior crime had not been prejudicial on
the facts of this case, it disapproved the admission of such evidence in
supplemental hearings on sentencing. Moreover, the court proceeded to
set forth the standards under which evidence was to be admitted in sen-
tencing hearings. In so doing, it reasoned that since the statute stated
no intention to change the standards of admissibility, evidence of prior
offenses must continue to be limited to the official record and defendant's
admissions.16 And the court expressly rejected any interpretation of the
statute which might admit evidence of the details of prior offenses,
17
stating that the statute so construed would violate the state constitution.18
9 Knowlton, supra note 8, at 1113; Note, 33 TEmP. L.Q. 89, 96 (1959).
10 Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 154, 143 Atl. 904, 907 (1928); see
Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 151, 160 Atl. 602, 608 (1932).
1 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 258 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 922 (1958) ; Knowlton, szpra note 8, at 1135-36; 19 U. PiTT.
L. REv. 666, 671 (1958). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, comment 5 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
12 See [1959] 4 LEG. JOUR. 4546 (Pa. Gen. Ass.) (remarks of Delegate Devlin).
13 Pa. Laws 1959, act 594, § 1.
14 PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1961).
1 405 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961).
16 Id. at 30, 172 A.2d at 798.
'7 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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California is the only other state which has a supplemental verdict
procedure to determine penalty in capital cases.19 Prior to 1957, when its
"Split-Verdict Act" was passed,2 0 California had not generally permitted
the introduction of evidence of prior offenses during the trial of the issue
of guilt when that evidence was to be considered solely on the question of
penalty. 12 The 1957 statute contains a general statement that evidence is
to be admitted, including evidence of defendant's "background and
history." 2 2  In People v. Purvis,2 3 the California Supreme Court stated
its approval of the admission during the penalty hearing not only of the
official record but also of the details of prior unrelated offenses, reasoning
that since the jury was required to assess the significance of defendant's
past acts, it should have all information relevant to that determination,
including details of defendant's conduct during the commission of prior
offenses.
2 4
In neither McCoy nor Purvis was the result required by statutory
language, nor are the minor differences in the two statutes sufficient to
explain the opposite conclusions reached by the courts. Moreover, it may
be suggested that in neither Pennsylvania nor California did either court
or legislature consider more than superficially the question of which evi-
dentiary rule better comports with the purposes of a split-verdict procedure
and of the punishment it administers. In determining the better rule for
such hearings, one must remember, moreover, that the policy of preventing
prejudice to the defendant which leads to exclusion of evidence descriptive
of prior crimes does not indicate that this evidence has no value; 25 when
19 See Handler, supra note 1, at 318. The California statute is CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.1. See also Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial,
49 CALI. L. REV. 805 (1961).
2o Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 2. This statute was amended in 1959, Cal. Stats.
1959, ch. 738, § 1.
21 See People v. Barclay, 40 Cal. 2d 146, 252 P.2d 321 (1953) ; Knowlton, supra
note 8, at 1112.
2 2 "Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty,
of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history,
and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.1.
23 52 Cal. 2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959). Defendant was convicted and sentenced to
death under CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 for the murder of a woman with whom he had
had a meretricious relationship. At the hearing on penalty, the fact that defendant
had previously killed his wife and evidence of the circumstances of the killing were
admitted. Defendant had previously been convicted of second degree murder. The
circumstances in both cases were strikingly similar; in both the women threatened to
leave defendant; in both they threatened to get him in trouble with the police; in both
defendant had a spell of "amnesia" following the murder. The sentence of death
was reversed on other grounds, and on remand Purvis was again sentenced to death.
On appeal, the second sentence of death was reversed because hearsay evidence of
the details of the prior crime had been admitted. People v. Purvis, 56 Cal. 2d 93,
362 P.2d 713, 13 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1961).
24 People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 881-82, 346 P.2d 22, 28 (1959).
2 5 "A defendant's character . . . as indicating the probability of his doing or
not doing the act charged, is essentially relevant." 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 55, at
450 (3d ed. 1940).
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the issue of guilt is eliminated in penalty hearings, evidentiary policies
should be reexamined with an eye to evidence relevant to the purpose of
the hearing-the imposition of the death penalty.
26
None of the theories under which the death penalty is justified can be
factually substantiated.2 7 The fact that the jury, rather than an expert
body, is permitted the discretion to impose the penalty, however, indicates
a strongly felt need for community judgment.28 and supports the conclu-
sion that continued imposition of the death penalty is based on a need to
satisfy the retributive impulse to inflict ultimate punishment aroused by
extreme crime.2 9 When the death penalty is imposed as a gratification of
this retributive impulse, the process of decision necessarily becomes arbi-
trary and irrational because members of the jury in making their deter-
mination-in the absence of an externally imposed standard-have only
their personal emotional response to -the particular case to rely on.30
Any attempt to minimize the irrationality involved in penalty deter-
minations must reduce as much as possible their emotional content. 31
From this point of view, the fact that evidence of defendant's character or
past criminal conduct might be highly emotional militates against admission
of such evidence. Rationality may be fostered, however, by emphasizing
other theories for imposing the death penalty-deterrence of others or
prevention of future killing by this individual criminal. Evidentiary
policies based on these other theories can supply external objective stand-
ards for penalty determination.3 2 Limiting use of relevant evidence, crucial
to those policies, may result in stymiing any effort to reduce the subjective,
2
6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has justified admission of evidence of prior
criminal conduct as necessary to show "what manner of man" defendant was. See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 594, 597, 50 A.2d 342, 344 (1947). The separate
hearing isolates the "manner of man" issue, but in McCoy the court referred to this
description as "a mere figure of speech used to connote succinctly what the evidentiary
rule of the Parker case embraced." Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 29, 172
A.2d 795, 797 (1961). It thus regarded the old rule in its narrowest form as applicable
to the new situation. See Handler, supra note 1, at 326-27.
27 See Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Report, CMD. No. 8932, at 17-24
(1953) ; MAss. H.R. Doc. No. 2575, at 33-46 (1958), reprinted in Capital Punishment
-The Issues and the Evidence, 5 CATHoLIc LAW. 269 (1960).
28 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
29 Cf. Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Report, CMD. No. 8932, at 17-18
(1953). For an interesting attempt to make retribution a rational theory, see Pollock
Retribution and the War on Crime, 102 SOL. J. 679 (1958).
30 See also Knowlton, supra note 8, at 1130-32. In contrast, the process of im-
posing penalty for lesser offenses, based on a theory of rehabilitation, is made as
rational as possible through imposition of sentence by administrative or judicial
officials. See Bennett, Individualizing the Sentencing Function, 27 F.R.D. 359, 363
(1961). Texas is one of several states which have a sentencing procedure permitting
the jury to set the penalty in noncapital cases. A recent study of this procedure
concludes that the jury's motivation "is more one of vengance than of rehabilitation."
Webster, Jury Sentencing-Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221, 226 (1960).
S1 Cf. Handler, supra note 1, at 326.
32 Cf. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 401-02
(1958).
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arbitrary element in the jury's determination. Moreover, both statutes
creating the split-verdict procedure contemplate the introduction of some
evidence of prior criminal conduct and character-at a minimum the official
record-, 3 3 and this legislative judgment comports with both a deterrence
and a protective rationale.
If the purpose of the death penalty is to deter future murders through
the execution of certain killers as examples,3 4 the method of selection may
be crucial to the effectiveness of the law. Presently, the killer who has
perpetrated a horrible or spectacular crime is more likely to be condemned
to death,35 yet it may be suggested that the perpetrator of the less brutal
killing is more likely to have acted through conscious calculation, and that
he and persons of like background and character are therefore more suit-
able objects of deterrence.3 6 If, on the other hand, the death penalty is
applied from fear that the specific defendant will again commit murder,
3 7
the focus of the determination should be on the likelihood that he will
become involved in situations which may result in another killing. In
either case, the decision to apply the death penalty should be made on
the basis of all available information about the defendant's criminal rec-
ord and character; in neither case is this information supplied by a mere
recitation of the defendant's prior record. For the revelation of the full
import of the defendant's record through the admission of evidence, not
of the mere categories of offenses committed but of the specific details of
these offenses, will best enable a jury to determine if the execution of this
defendant will serve to deter others or if it is deemed necessary to prevent
the defendant himself from perpetrating further killings.
Admission of this evidence without explanation to the jury of its
proper use would, however, add to the possibility of a purely emotional
determination and reinforce the retributive impulse of the jury. Judicial
instruction on the purposes of the death penalty is therefore necessary to
provide a rational pattern into which the jury might fit the evidence.38 In
California, charges on the issue of penalty have thus far been limited to
reference to the "absolute discretion" of the jury to determine the penalty
3 See note 14 supra; note 22 supra and accompanying text.
34 See generally SELLiN, THE DE.ATH PENALTY 19-63 (1959) ; Ball, The Deter-
rence Concept it Criminology and Law, 46 J. Cpan. L., C. & P.S. 347, 352 (1955).
Research has failed to prove that capital punishment deters murder. See Savitz, A
Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J. GRrs. L., C. & P.S. 338 (1958).
35 This may be explained by the retribution theory. See notes 28-29 supra and
accompanying text.
386 See Gerstein, A Prosecutor Looks at Capital Punishment, 51 J. Cans. L., C.
& P.S. 252, 256 (1960).
3 7 Standing alone, this rationale may not be a justification for the death penalty,
since recidivism among first degree murderers is low. See Royal Comm'n on Capital
Punishment, Report, CMD. No. 8932, at 228 (1953). See generally id. at 215-39.
38 See People v. Love, 56 Cal. 2d 720, 743, 366 P.2d 33, 43, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777,
790 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
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after considering all the circumstances.&3 9 The supplemental verdict pro-
cedure presents the opportunity for the articulation of proper standards-
both statutes seem to permit jury instruction on penalty.40 If these
authorizations were construed as allowing instruction on the proper pur-
poses of the imposition of the death penalty, the evidence issue presented
by the McCoy and Purvis cases could be resolved in a way which would
bring more rationality to the procedure.
Since the penalty hearing is an adversary proceeding, there is no
single agency responsible for presenting all relevant evidence. In a given
case the detailed conduct on which the prior conviction was based might
not exhibit the type of criminality condemned; the prosecution might then
make the decision to limit the evidence to the record and thus to raise
the inference that the defendant's criminality was the type for which the
death penalty is provided. Although the defendant may adduce evidence
of good character as a mitigating factor,41 such evidence may not be suffi-
cient to rebut this inference. It is important to prevent unfairness to the
convicted killer through such manipulation by the prosecution of evidence
of prior convictions by permitting the defendant to rebut the adverse in-
ference by showing his conduct on the former occasion, even though a
direct attack on-and thus a relitigation of-the former offense may not
be permissible for administrative reasons.42  The line between showing
details of conduct and attacking the validity of the prior conviction would
necessarily be a fine one, but intelligent limitation by the court of admis-
sible evidence and mode of proof and argument could forestall any at-
tempt to relitigate the former offense.43 Balancing the probative value of
evidence against its possible prejudicial effect is a familiar process in the
trial of the issue of guilt." This same process would apply to limit pos-
39 People v. Purvis, 56 Cal. 2d 93, 96, 362 P.2d 713, 715, 13 Cal. Rptr. 801, 803
(1961).
4 0 The Pennsylvania statute seems to contemplate some charge on the issue of
penalty. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1961). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has left unclear the possible effect of these words. Commonwealth v. McCoy,
405 Pa. 23, 35, 172 A.2d 795, 800 (1961) (dictum). The California statute, on the
other hand, does not seem to contemplate any control of the jury's discretion. "The
determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be in the discretion
of the court or jury trying the issue . . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1. But the
California Supreme Court has permitted a general charge on the issue of penalty.
See People v. Lane, 56 Cal. 2d 773, 786-87, 366 P.2d 57, 65, 16 Cal. Rptr. 801, 809
(1961).
41See MoDEL PENAL CODE §201.6(4)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); cf. 1
WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 56 (3d ed. 1940).
42 See Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 268, 168 A.2d 732, 734, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 868 (1961) : "To permit a jury to retry cases of former convictions in order
to consider the propriety of the convictions, or of the sentence, or possible mitigating
circumstances would befog and make trials almost interminable and practically and
legally, be utterly ridiculous." California's position is that the jury determining
penalty is not bound by the findings of the prior jury. People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d
871, 882, 346 P.2d 22, 28 (1959).
43 See McCoRmicic, EViDENCE § 152, at 319-21 (1954); UNIFORM RULE OF Evi-
DEN E 45 (1953).
44 See Handler, supra note 1, at 324.
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sible prejudicial impact of evidence of prior criminal conduct, presented
during the penalty hearing.45 Evidence having the least prejudicial impact
would be preferred, but this preference should not be translated into a
blanket policy of exclusion. Admissibility, therefore, should depend upon
a finding by the trial court that evidence of the details of defendant's con-
duct on prior occasions are relevant and not unduly prejudicial on the
issue of character.
EVIDENCE-HuSBAND'S UNREASONABIM SEaRCH BAmS ADMIS-
sIoN oF EvENC E oF WIFE's ADuLTERY nT His SUIT FOR DIVORCE
A husband seeking grounds for a New York divorce staged an early
morning raid on his estranged wife's apartment to secure proof of her
adultery. He and his companions found the wife with an alleged paramour,
took photographs, and searched the rooms. He then sued for divorce,
and the wife filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence acquired by
means of the intrusion. The New York Supreme Court for Kings County
sustained the wife's motion, holding that evidence obtained by a private
individual in violation of a New York statute prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures 1 was inadmissible in his civil action. Sackler v.
Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct.), rez'd, 16 App.
Div. 2d 423 (1962).
Evidence was not excludible at common law on the ground that it
had been wrongfully obtained.2 A series of United States Supreme Court
decisions, culminating in Mapp v. Ohio,3 has created a major exception to
this rule by prohibiting in both state and federal criminal proceedings the
45 See People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 856, 350 P.2d 705, 712-13, 3 Cal. Rptr.
655, 672-73 (1960): "Allegedly inflammatory evidence is admissible only when its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. . . . The determination of penalty
. . . like the determination of guilt, must be a rational decision. Evidence that
serves primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors must therefore be excluded,
and to insure that it is, the probative value and the inflammatory effect of proffered
evidence must be carefully weighed."
'N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTs LAw § 8: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . ... "
2 4 JONEs, EVIDENCE § 868 (5th ed. 1958) ; McCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 137 (1954);
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Coerced confessions and
evidence gathered in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination were well-
known exceptions to the rule. 4 JONES, EVIENCE § 868 (5th ed. 1958) ; MCCORMIcK,
EVIDENCE § 137 (1954). For the British experience, see Cowen, The Admissibility
of Evidence Procured Through Illegal Searches and Seizures in British Common-
wealth Jurisdictions, 5 VAND. L. Rxv. 523 (1952).
3 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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use of evidence procured in violation of the United States Constitution.4
A similar exception has been developing in civil cases in which the federal
government offers evidence which it has obtained unconstitutionally. 5 More-
over, in criminal prosecutions, some courts have excluded evidence which
was illegally-but not unconstitutionally-obtained by government offi-
cials.6 But the courts have consistently admitted evidence wrongfully ac-
quired by private individuals in both civil and criminal actions.7 Until the
present decision, the sole suggestion of a departure from this practice had
been the Michigan Supreme Court's 1958 statement in Lebel v. Swincicki 8
-a wrongful death action arising from an automobile accident-that it was
error to admit testimony based on the analysis of a blood sample taken
from the defendant in violation of a Michigan constitutional prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures.9
The present decision represents a resolution of familiar competing con-
siderations: the desirability of having the court decide the case before it
4 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5 See United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949) (forfeiture pro-
ceeding) ; Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938) (recovery of cus-
toms duties), 6 U. CI. L. Rv. 113; United States v. One 1960 Lincoln Two-Door
Hard-Top, 195 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1961) (forfeiture proceeding); Schenck
ex rel. Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1938) (immigration
proceeding). But see United States v. One 1956 Ford 2-Door Sedan, 185 F. Supp.
76 (E.D. Ky. 1960) (forfeiture proceeding); Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair,
46 F.2d 648 (D.N.J. 1930) (revocation of beverage permit), dimnissed as moot,
46 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1931). Compare United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336
U.S. 793 (1949); Calumet Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 160 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir.
1947), evidence admitted in licensing case, but no participation by the government
in the wrongful acquisition.
6E.g., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Cameron v. State, 365
P.2d 576 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); see TEX. CoDE CRmu. PROC. ANNq. art. 727a
(Supp. 1961).
7 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (criminal action); Calumet
Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 160 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (licensing case); Munson
v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946) (custody proceeding); People v.
Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (criminal action) ;
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 342, 92 S.W.2d 346 (1936) (criminal action);
Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193, 58 N.W. 1009 (1894) (garnishment suit);
Thanhauser v. Milprint, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 833, 192 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959) (work-
men's compensation); Neff v. Franklinville Roofing Co., 283 App. Div. 903, 130
N.Y.S.2d 101 (1954), aff'd mein., 308 N.Y. 946, 127 N.E.2d 94 (1955) (workmen's
compensation); Hernandez v. Brookdale Mills, Inc., 201 App. Div. 325, 194 N.Y.
Supp. 283 (1922) (contract action) ; Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Stem, 1 Misc.
2d 849, 150 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (petition for injunction); Walker v.
Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) (personal injury action); 8 WiGMORE,
EViDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 2d
399, 49 P.2d 832 (1935), a disbarment proceeding in which the examiner for the
bar association made "free use" of illegally obtained documents, but did not offer
them in evidence.
8354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958), 17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 155 (1960).
0 MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 10. The judgment below was affirmed, however, be-
cause of the sufficiency of the other evidence. The appellate division, in reversing,
distinguished Lebel on the ground that it, unlike the instant case, dealt with evidence
obtained by physical assault. 16 App. Div. 2d at 427.
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on the basis of all available evidence as weighed against the desirability
of having the court protect the individual's right to security of his person
and home by means of an exclusionary rule. The present court's choice
on this balance is in direct conflict with the overwhelming weight of New
York authority. In People v. Defore,10 the New York Court of Appeals
expressly rejected the rationale of the existing federal exclusionary rule
and admitted evidence acquired by a police officer in violation of fhe
statute involved in the present case-section 8 of the New York Civil
Rights Law.", The court of appeals declared that evidence was tradi-
tionally admissible when acquired illegally by a private litigant and that
the same rule was to be applied to evidence obtained illegally by police
officers for use in criminal prosecutions. 2  In both criminal 13 and civil ' 4
cases, the New York courts have frequently reiterated their adherence to
the policy definitively articulated in Defore-that relevant and competent
evidence is not to be excluded because wrongfully obtained. Moreover,
the legislature has rejected several proposed statutes embodying an exclu-
sionary rule,15 and the court of appeals has stated that it regards the legis-
lature as having acquiesced in its rulings admitting illegally acquired evi-
dence.' 6 The Defore rule is limited by Mapp v. Ohio 17 only in that that
case requires the exclusion from state criminal prosecutions of evidence
obtained in violation of the federal Constitution; 18 in all other cases, the
Defore rule remains the controlling New York authority. In its first
decision applying Mapp, the court of appeals expressly declared that but
10242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
"1 Quoted in note 1 supra.
12 242 N.Y. at 22, 150 N.E. at 588.
13 E.g., People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857, 185 N.Y.S2d 1 (1959) ;
People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943).
14Thanhauser v. Milprint, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 833, 192 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959);
In the Matter of the Adoption of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90
(1955); Neff v. Franklinville Roofing Co., 283 App. Div. 903, 130 N.Y.S.2d 101
(1954), aff'd nere., 308 N.Y. 946, 127 N.E.2d 94 (1955); In the Matter of Davis,
252 App. Div. 591, 299 N.Y. Supp. 632 (1937) (disbarment proceeding); Revere
Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Stern, 1 Misc. 2d 849, 150 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1953);
Bovey v. State, 197 Misc. 302, 93 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Ct Cl. 1949) ; Bloodgood v. Lynch,
293 N.Y. 308, 56 N.E.2d 718 (1944) (dictum); Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co.,
25 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (dictum).
15 Peterfreund, Evidence, 1955 Survey of N.Y. Law, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1670,
1681 (1955). The legislature has, however, recently excluded wiretap evidence in
civil cases. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 345-a.
16 People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 168-69, 51 N.E.2d 690, 693
(1943); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 588, cert. denied, 27r U.S.
657 (1926). See also People v. Katz, 201 Misc. 414, 415-16, 114 N.Y.S.2d 360,
361-62 (County Ct 1952); Brief for Appellant, pp. 12-13, Sackler v. Sackler, 16
App. Div. 2d 423 (1962).
17367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18 See People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462
(1961).
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for Mapp it would affirm the lower court's admission of the evidence on the
authority of Defore and its progeny. 19 Although the court in the present
case recognized that Mapp-a constitutional decision designed to check
police lawlessness-did not compel a decision either way, it nonetheless
seized upon Mapp as a justification for its formulation of a new exclu-
sionary rule.20 In so doing, the court summarily disposed of all the pre-
Mapp authorities, saying that they were based on the now discredited
notion of giving "a freer hand to governmental authority to ferret out
crime." 21 Even if this cursory explanation were sufficient to distinguish
previous criminal cases, it in no way explains the civil cases-untouched
by even the rationale of Mapp-in which illegally acquired evidence was
uniformly held admissible.22 In the light of the existing New York policy
of nonexclusion in this area left open by Mapp, it is at least questionable
whether the court in the present case should have deemed itself free to
reassess the desirability of an exclusionary rule for private litigation.
23
Moreover, even if the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in
civil cases were an open question in New York, there is strong reason to
criticize the present court's resolution of that question. Specifically, those
factors which drove the United States Supreme Court to decide that the
exclusionary rule announced in Mapp was the only way to give effective
enforcement to the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure 24 are either not present or are present only to a lesser degree
in the case of illegal methods of evidence collection on the part of private
parties for use in civil litigation.25  Thus, the absolute ineffectiveness of
civil or criminal trespass actions against offending police officers 26 does
not seem to have a counterpart in the case of private citizens who break
19 Id. at 370, 179 N.E.2d at 480, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
20 See instant case at 601-02, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 792. The judge in the present case
had previously indicated his dislike of the Defore rule. See In the Matter of Miller,
22 Misc. 2d 486, 490, 193 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
21 Instant case at 602, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
22 Cases cited note 14 supra.
23 For a recent holding by one of the most respected of state high courts to the
effect that a lower court lacks the jurisdiction to refuse to follow the holding of a
higher court directly on point, see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369
P.2d 937, 20 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1962) (in bank).
Nevertheless, two dissenting justices in the appellate division gave their approval
to the course taken by the trial court. In fact, perhaps the strongest defense of the
exclusionary rule in civil actions yet to be given by a court is to be found in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Hopkins. 16 App. Div. 2d at 427-32.
24 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-58 (1961).
25 Discussion here is confined to illegal entries to procure evidence. Whereas
police searches and seizures, legal or illegal, are normally directed at producing evi-
dence for use in court, the same is obviously not true of the majority of illegal
entries by private citizens. Hence an exclusionary rule is unlikely to be nearly as
effective in curbing the broad range of intrusions by private citizens as in controlling
police misfeasance.
26 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 42-43 (1949). This was clearly in the mind of the Court in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961), when it chose to overrule Wolf.
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and enter to seize evidence.27 Clearly, a private citizen cannot argue to the
jury that his act of trespass was necessary for the protection of the whole
citizenry: in the eyes of the jury, if no evidence is discovered, the private
citizen becomes a common housebreaker, the policeman a mistaken guardian
of the peace; if evidence is discovered, the private citizen is still-for ex-
ample-a lucky husband with grounds for a divorce, the policeman a hero
who has done his duty in ferreting out criminals, albeit by a means rendered
illegal by a "technicality." Hence the trespass action, although expensive
and time-consuming, does offer an alternative means of protecting the
home against unwarranted intrusions. Even when, as in the present case,
the value of the evidence to the potential housebreaker outweighs the de-
terrent effect of civil or criminal remedies against illegal intrusions, the
exclusion rule is of questionable value. True, exclusion would guarantee
that searches for evidence would be confined to legal means; otherwise
they would be of no value. But the result of an exclusionary rule is
specifically to remove relevant evidence from the consideration of the
court.2 8 In the present case, the result was the denial to the husband of
the divorce to which, under New York law, he was presumably entitled
on the basis of the excluded evidence. Since that law grants divorces only
on the basis of adultery,29 the aggrieved spouse must often face the choice
of violating the civil rights act or of retaining an adulterous partner; hence
it is not surprising that some divorce-seekers would choose to violate the
act.2 0 But the alternative chosen by the court in the present case is to
deny effective relief under the divorce laws in order to implement the
civil rights act. In so doing, it appears to have ignored precedent and to
have exceeded its role as a trial court in order to formulate a rule of, at best,
dubious merit.
27 Two other factors, beyond those discussed hereafter, may have bearing in
deciding against the application of an exclusionary rule to evidence illegally seized
by private citizens and offered in civil litigation. First, there seems to be a greater
compulson to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence than to exclude that seized
merely in violation of nonconstitutional law. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
659 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-69 (1928). Second,
insofar as the exclusionary rules concerning police-obtained evidence for use in
criminal trials is related to the supervisory power of the courts rather than the
direct commands of the constitution, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678-79 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), it is clearly not equally appropriate
for the courts to exclude privately obtained evidence in civil suits, although notions
of estoppel and "clean hands" are not completely inapposite here.
28 See the classic statements of Wigmore and Cardozo: 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2184, at 40 (3d ed. 1940) ("Titus and Flavius") ; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) ("The criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.").
29 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1147.
30 Nevertheless, even in the circumstances of the present case, it may still be
suggested that the rule is unnecessary for the protection of the innocent. In view
of the mores of our society and the penalties attaching to an illegal entry, a private
party, like the husband in the present case, will be loath to break down a bedroom
door unless he is certain that it is his wife that is inside.
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GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY-FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT PERMITS SUITS BY FEDERAL PRISONERS
Appellant, a prisoner in a United States penitentiary, brought an ac-'
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 alleging that negligent diagnosis
and treatment by prison medical officers caused him to become permanently
blind. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
Tort Claims Act was not applicable to prisoners. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed, holding, over a trenchant dissent, that the
Federal Tort Claims Act permits suits against the United States by federal
prisoners for the negligence of prison officials. Winston v. United States,
Docket No. 27098, 2d Cir., Feb. 27, 1962, opinion adopted and supple-
mented on rehearing en banc, Docket No. 27098, 2d Cir., June 28, 1962.
The familiar concept of sovereign immunity has insulated the federal
and state governments from liability for the torts of their agents except
when the governmental unit has consented to such liability.2 Thus, while
prisoners have been permitted to sue prison officials in tort as individuals,3
they have traditionally been unable to sue the state itself. In the face of
this general rule, however, the courts of one state which has generally
waived its immunity from suit have construed the waiver as permitting
suits for injuries sustained by prisoners.4 The Federal Tort Claims Act
provides that the United States will be liable for the torts of federal em-
ployees "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." 5 Liability for the claim is to be "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances .... ." 6 The broad statutory waiver of immunity is
restricted by thirteen express exceptions,7 to which the courts have added
two by implication. In Feres v. United States,8 the Supreme Court held
128 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-74 (1958).
22 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§29.1-.3, 29.12-.15 (1956); PRossER, TORTS § 109
(2d ed. 1955).
3 E.g., Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875
(1960); State ex rel. Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940) ; Mc-
Cartney v. West Virginia, 156 F.2d 739, 741 (4th Cir. 1946) (dictum). Contra,
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950);
Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A.2d 220 (1961). In the latter cases the concept
of sovereign immunity was extended to protect prison officials while they were acting
within the scope of their authority. See generally Note, 34 IND. L.J. 609, 612-13
(1959).
4 See McCrossen v. State, 277 App. Div. 1160, 101 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1950); Wash-
ington v. State, 277 App. Div. 1079, 100 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1950).
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
628 U.S.C. §2674 (1958).
728 U.S.C. §2680 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §2680(n) (Supp. II 1960).
8 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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that the act did not permit suits by members of the armed forces for
injuries sustained while on active duty. Relying on the reasoning and
result in Feres, a district court implied a similar exception for suits by
federal prisoners for alleged negligence of government employees in Sigmon
v. United States.9 Sigmon has been followed by other district courts 10
and by the courts of appeals for the seventh 11 and eighth ' 2 circuits; the
present case is the first to reject the gloss placed upon the statute by
Sigmon. 3
The Feres decision was based upon the peculiar relationship between
servicemen and the government, a relationship offering no analogy to any
liability of private individuals "in like circumstances,"' 14 and upon the
existence of an established system of compensation for injuries or death of
those in military service.' 5 The Sigmon court followed similar reasoning.
The prisoner there was eligible for relief from the federal prison industries
fund.' 6 Moreover, since the United States is liable under the Tort Claims
Act only in the same manner as a "private individual under like circum-
stances," the court reasoned that there could be no liability because no
"private individual has the legal right to hold any other private individual
in penal servitude." ' 7 Further, the court stated that it has been the policy
of Congress to treat all federal prisoners uniformly and that this would
be impossible if the prisoners' rights of action depended on "the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred."'18 Finally, the court spoke of
the possible detriment to prison discipline which could spring from the
allowance of such suits.' 9 In a series of decisions applying the rule in
Signwn, the courts substantially undercut the reasoning of that case. Thus,
in Van Zuch v. United States, ° relief was denied for injuries that occurred
while the prisoner was a patient in a prison hospital and hence ineligible
for industrial compensation benefits and although suit was brought at a time
when the plaintiff was no longer in prison, thereby rendering inapposite
the discipline rationale. And in Berman v. United States,2 ' the exception
9 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
10 See instant case at 1230-31 (dissenting opinion) (collecting cases).
1 Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
12 Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958).
'3 Cf. Lawrence v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961) (against
federal employees).
14 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).
15 Id. at 144. There was, however, no problem of double recovery as in Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
6 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
17 Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D. Va. 1953).
18 Id. at 908.
19 Id. at 910.
20118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (alternative holding).
21170 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
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was extended to apply to a person who was convicted of possession of
narcotics but had been placed in a federal hospital rather than a prison,
despite the fact that the operation of hospitals is not a function denied to
private individuals.
Clearly, these extensions of the Sigmon rule run against the reasoning
which the courts had been applying to the Tort Claims Act in other areas.
Thus, in the field in which the Supreme Court had carved the first excep-
tion to the act-that of injuries to servicemen-the Feres holding was
strictly limited to those cases in which an alternative scheme of compensa-
tion had been provided by Congress; recovery has been permitted where
the injury was sustained by servicemen not on active duty22 And in two
cases involving activities which, it was argued, were peculiarly govern-
mental and had no analogy to activities of private persons,2 3 the Supreme
Court held that the Tort Claims Act must be construed broadly enough
to permit recovery for tortious injury despite the peculiar status of the
person inflicting that injury although the law of the state in which the
injury occurred might limit recovery because of this status2 4 That is, the
Court reasoned that the federal waiver of immunity should not be limited
by the fact that the state had not similarly waived its immunity. Nor does
the status of the prisoner-in distinction to that of the prison official-
deprive him of his right to recovery under the act. Not only was this
rationale expressly rejected in Sigmon,-2 5 but there is a developing law
which maintains that prisoners do have rights and that they should be
permitted to enforce these rights in court 2 6 Finally, the supposed federal
policy of creating uniform rights for prisoners cannot justify the exten-
sion of the Sigmon rule, and this for three reasons. First, in view of those
decisions which clearly imply that the rights of federal prisoners do not
2 2 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See generally Comment, 11
DEPAuL L. REv. 97, 107-08 (1961).
23 See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (fighting forest fire
on government land); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)
(operation of lighthouse).
24 [T]he test established by the Tort Claims Act for determining the United
States' liability is whether a private person would be responsible for similar
negligence under the laws of the State where the acts occurred. We ex-
pressly decided . . . liability is not restricted to the liability of a municipal
corporation or other public body and that an injured party cannot be deprived
of his rights under the Act by resort to an alleged distinction, imported from
the law of municipal corporations, between the Government's negligence
when it acts in a "proprietary" capacity and its negligence when it acts in
a "uniquely governmental" capacity.
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, supra note 23, at 319.
25 Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 908 (W.D. Va. 1953) (dictum).
26 See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962). An example of this growing
concern for prisoners' rights may be found in recent interpretations of the Civil
Rights Act, REv. STAT. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-88 (1958), permitting
prisoners' suits despite arguments that prisoners were to be excepted from the cover-
age of the act. See Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (dictum),
aft'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950); Gordon v. Garrson,
77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948) (dictum).
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depend upon the rights of state prisoners in the state in which they are
injured,2 " no great lack of uniformity seems likely to arise from the ap-
plication of the Tort Claims Act to federal prisoners. Again, in choosing
to follow the law of the place of the injury rather than to formulate a
uniform federal tort law, Congress clearly accepted a degree of variety in
the rights of injured parties seeking relief under the act 2 8 And finally,
in view of the absence of alternative remedies for many-if not most-
injured prisoners, to say that Congress intended that all federal prisoners
should have uniform rights is tantamount to saying that Congress intended
that prisoners should have no rights at all. In stun, then, the strong
reasons supporting the present decision seem sufficient to justify the court
in reaching a result contrary to what appeared to be the settled rule of the
lower federal courts, particularly one involving tortious injury, where there
can be no justifiable reliance on an immunity to protect the wrongdoer.
29
Moreover, it seems likely that the present case, by creating a conflict in
circuits, will lead to a Supreme Court decision which will serve further to
clarify the application of the Tort Claims Act and, in view of the prior
decisions of the Court, to extend the rights of prisoners to suffer no more
than the penalty imposed upon them by law.
2 7 See notes 18, 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
28This argument is not completely sound. Normally the beneficiaries of the
Tort Claims Act are likely to be private citizens injured by the actions of a govern-
ment employee. Clearly, there is at least as much reason to apply the same law in
allowing recovery by a Connecticut citizen struck by a mail truck in Connecticut
as would be applied had he been struck by a private delivery truck in the same state
as there is to equate his recovery with that of a California citizen struck by a mail
truck in California. The prisoner, by contrast, lives in a peculiarly federal context,
but hardly more so than the lighthouse keeper, forest ranger, or nuclear physicist
employed in atomic testing.
29 This is particularly true in that the federal government is a self-insurer.
Cf. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
1962]
